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1 |  INTRODUCTION
China's shadow banking has been growing significantly in the last decade. The increasing sophisti-
cation of the financial system can be both a blessing and a curse. While corporations and households 
benefit from the rapidly growing shadow banking as an alternative funding channel, regulators face 
challenges of maintaining financial stability in a more complex market. The fundamental questions 
are how the shadow banking system of China, the largest economy in the world in Purchasing Power 
Parity terms, relates to its economic growth and whether the shadow banking amplifies or reduces 
Received: 21 May 2020 | Accepted: 21 May 2020
DOI: 10.1111/manc.12331  
S P E C I A L  I S S U E  A R T I C L E
Shadow banking in China compared to other 
countries
Franklin Allen1 |   Xian Gu2,3
1Imperial College Business School, 
Imperial College London, London, UK
2Durham University Business School, 
Durham University, Durham, UK
3Central University of Finance and 
Economics, Beijing, China
Correspondence
Franklin Allen, Imperial College Business 
School, Imperial College London, Tanaka 
Building, London, SW7 2AZ, UK.
Email: f.allen@imperial.ac.uk
Abstract
China's shadow banking has been rising rapidly in the last 
decade, mainly driven by regulations for banks, the Fiscal 
Stimulus Plan in 2008 and credit constraints in restrictive 
industries. This sector has continued growing although the 
regulators repeatedly attempted to impose new regulations 
on banks and nonbanks. The existence of shadow banking 
fulfills the high demand for funding. The standard view is 
that it poses risks to financial stability. However, in China, 
this is not necessarily the case. Entrusted loans, implicit 
guarantees from nonbanks, banks or government may pro-
vide a second-best arrangement in funding risky projects 
and improving welfare.
K E Y W O R D S
credit constraint, financial stability, implicit guarantee, regulation, 
shadow banking
J E L  C L A S S I F I C A T I O N
G20; G21; G23; G28
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creat ive Commo ns Attri bution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2020 The Authors. The Manchester School published by The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
2 |   ALLEN ANd GU
systemic risk. It is also important to know how the structure of China's shadow banking is different 
from that in other jurisdictions around the world.
The literature on China's shadow banking has also been actively growing in recent years. This 
paper aims to discuss the emergence, growth and components of China's shadow banking, provide a 
comparison with the counterparts in the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe and review the 
recent literature. In Section 2, we review the connections between banks and shadow banks in China 
and then explore the structure of China's shadow banking. We consider how it has been able to grow 
under light regulations and then discuss the risks embedded in this sector as well as the role of gov-
ernment. Section 3 compares China's shadow banking with that in other places. Section 4 concludes.
2 |  SHADOW BANKING IN CHINA
2.1 | Banks and the rise of shadow banking
China's financial system has been dominated by a state-owned banking system. A large literature 
has documented that the government supports the state-owned sector much more than the private 
sector by granting large-scale bank loans through the traditional commercial banks (e.g., Brandt & 
Zhu, 2000; Cong, Gao, Ponticelli, & Yang, 2019). Therefore, a natural question is how the private 
sector has been able to develop without sufficient access to finance over time. Allen, Qian, and Qian 
(2005) argue that an alternative financial sector including informal financing, built on trust, relation-
ship and reputation, has played an important role in supporting the growth of a private sector that has 
been growing much faster than both the state sector and the listed sector. In recent years, in addition 
to informal financing, nonbank financial institutions and shadow banking have provided significant 
financing for growth for this sector.
Shadow banking is broadly defined as credit intermediation that occurs through activities and entities 
outside the regulated financial system (Adrian & Ashcraft, 2012). In China, the activities component 
of shadow banking includes the issuance by a variety of institutions of wealth management products 
(WMPs), asset management products (AMPs), entrusted loans, trust loans, undiscounted bankers’ ac-
ceptance, finance company loans, microcredit by, peer-to-peer (P2P) lending and informal lending. 
Examples of shadow banking entities are trust companies, broker dealers, P2P platforms and so forth.
Figure 1 shows the breakdown of total social financing and the size of different sources of funding 
in China.1 Funding from banks includes bank loans in local and foreign currencies through the tradi-
tional banking system; shadow banking funding includes entrusted loans, trust loans, undiscounted 
banker's acceptance, informal lending and others; funding from markets include capital raised through 
both equity and bond markets. From 2002 to 2019, on average, bank loans constitute 72.5% of the total 
social financing, with shadow banking and markets contributing 18.5% and 8.9%, respectively. Since 
2009, the shadow banking sector has experienced tremendous growth, reaching 32.9% of the total fi-
nancing in 2016.
The reasons behind the fast growth include liquidity regulation, the Stimulus Plan launched in 2008, 
as well as credit constraints in certain industries. Hachem and Song (2017) document that one of the 
main causes of Chinese shadow banking growth was regulatory arbitrage of liquidity rules, in 
 1Total social financing, a term defined by the People's Bank of China (PBoC), refers to the total funds the real economy 
obtained from the financial system over a certain period of time. It measures money offered by domestic suppliers, including 
financial institutions, households and nonfinancial corporations and entities. For more details, please see, Allen, Qian and Gu 
(2017).
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particular, the 75% cap on the loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR). In August 2010, the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) announced that WMPs issued by banks could invest at most 30% in 
trust loans in order to reduce the links between banks and trust companies. In March 2013, the CBRC 
announced that WMPs could invest at most 35% in non-standard debt assets (including trust assets).2 
This change led to rapid growth in a new instrument called trust beneficiary rights to help channel 
WMP funds to trust companies.3 Several other studies also link the rise of shadow banking to the Four-
trillion Fiscal Stimulus Plan in 2008. Using provincial and city-level data, Chen, He, and Liu (2020) 
show that the upsurge of shadow banking is driven by the high financing demand in certain industries, 
triggered specifically by the Four-Trillion Fiscal Stimulus Plan in 2008. Acharya, Qian, Su, and Yang 
(2019) explain the growth of bank WMPs and find that the competition in the deposit market intensified 
 2Non-standard debt asset, is a term defined by the CBRC as a debt instrument that is not traded in the interbank bond market 
or stock exchange. As such, it includes instruments such as trust loans, various types of beneficiary rights, bankers’ 
acceptance, letters of credit, accounts receivables and equity financing under repurchase agreements. The annual reports of 
China Bank Wealth Management Products give details of investments of bank WMPs. The report of 2018 (in Chinese) is 
available at: https://www.china wealth.com.cn/resou rce/830/846/863/51198 /52005 /30182 53/15538 43656 66815 49348 93.pdf.
 3There have been various regulations on shadow banking in this period. For example, in 2013, the State Council, in Order 
107, identifies the agencies responsible for different supervisory tasks: the State Council, CBRC, CSRC (China Securities 
Regulatory Commission), CIRC (China Insurance Regulatory Commission) and the PBoC. For more details, please see: 
General Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Notice of the General Office of the State Council on 
Issues Concerning Strengthening the Supervision of Shadow banking, December 31, 2013. This Order distinguished between 
credit intermediaries with and without financial licenses.
F I G U R E  1  Breakdown of total social financing in China: banks, shadow banks and markets. This figure plots 
the breakdown of total social financing (i.e., the sources of funding from banks, shadow banks and markets) in China. 
Funding from banks include bank loans in local currency (RMB) and foreign currencies; funding from shadow banks 
include entrusted loans and trust loans, and others; funding from the markets contains capital raising through equity 
and bond markets. Defined by the PBoC, total social financing covers loans in the local currency, loans in foreign 
currency, entrusted loans, trust loans, undiscounted bankers’ acceptances, corporate bond financing and equity 
financing for nonfinancial corporations. Source: PBoC; Moody's
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following the stimulus plan in 2008 and consequently, banks facing a short-fall in deposits, especially 
small and medium-sized banks, issue more WMPs to attract funding. Hachem (2018) argues that regu-
latory arbitrage is a more compelling explanation of the fast rise of shadow banking than Fiscal Stimulus. 
In addition, as a supplement to traditional monetary policy tools, the People's Bank of China (PBoC), 
the central bank of China, imposes loan quotas to commercial banks in some restrictive areas (e.g., the 
real estate industry and industries with overcapacity) through window guidance.4 Because of the strict 
regulation on lending to the real estate industry and to local government financing platforms, there has 
been a large gap between the financing demand and bank loans in these areas (Allen, Gu, Li, Qian, & 
Qian, 2020; Allen, Gu, & Qian, 2018). Figure 2 shows that the funding gap of real estate investments 
(the difference between real estate investments and bank loans to real estate) has increased significantly 
in the last decade, along with the growth of shadow banking. Consistently, both Allen, Qian, Tu, and Yu 
(2019) and Allen et al. (2020) document that the majority of the funds raised through nonaffiliated en-
trusted loans and trust products have flowed to the real estate and infrastructure industries. Wang, 
Wang, Wang, and Zhou (2019) document that the shadow banking sector in China channels the funds 
to capital-deprived and high-productivity private firms and reduces capital idleness.
2.2 | Structure of shadow banking
Figure 3 shows how the components of China's shadow banking sector evolve from 2010 to 2019. 
On average, the largest component is assets funded by bank WMPs or AMPs of broker-dealer firms, 
 4Please see Section 2.2 for more discussion about the window guidance by the PBoC.
F I G U R E  2  Housing price, funding gap of real estate investments and shadow banking activities. This figure 
plots the national average housing price, the funding gap of real estate investments (the difference between real estate 
investments and bank loans flowing to real estate), as well as the total shadow banking activities. The data of housing 
price and real estate investments come from the National Bureau of Statistics of China; the data of bank loans to real 
estate come from the PBoC; the data of shadow banking come from the PBoC and Moody's. Source: National Bureau 
of Statistics; PBoC; Moody's
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constituting 29.4% of the total shadow banking assets, followed by entrusted loans, undiscounted 
bankers’ acceptance and trust loans. In addition, these components are usually taken as core shadow 
banking assets, while the broader concept of shadow banking also contains loans by finance compa-
nies, informal lending and others, (Moody's, 2020).
Bank WMPs are off-balance-sheet investment products issued by banks as substitutes for deposits 
to circumvent liquidity regulations, raise funds and increase profits. Interest rates were tightly regu-
lated in China before the lifting of the upper bound on deposits rates in 2015. However, interest rates 
on bank WMPs are much less regulated than deposit rates and the raised funds via these products are 
invested in projects without affecting issuing banks’ on-balance sheet assets (Acharya et al., 2019). 
The size of bank WMPs began to take off in 2011 and the balance reached 32.10 trillion RMB by 
2018. Majority bank WMP funds flowed to the bond market. For example, in 2018, 53.4% of bank 
WMP funds flowed to the bond market, followed by 17.2% invested in non-standard debt assets (in-
cluding trust assets) and 9.9% invested in equity related assets.
Undiscounted bankers’ acceptances (BAs) are short-term debt instruments issued by a company 
with trade credit guaranteed by a bank. As long as the company does not need to fall back on this 
guarantee, these instruments are undiscounted and hence treated as off-balance-sheet items of the 
issuing bank. If the company cannot repay the third party and this party needs to cash in on the bank's 
guarantee, then the guarantee is discounted and appears on the balance sheet of the issuing bank. The 
possible risk is in extreme situations when all of these guarantees may be discounted at the same time 
(Hachem, 2018). By 2019, the size of undiscounted BAs amounted to 11.4 trillion RMB.
Entrusted loans are intercorporate loans with a bank as a serving agent, who earns a serving fee but 
bears no risk. Using transaction-level data, Allen et al. (2019) investigate two types of entrusted loans 
F I G U R E  3  Components of shadow banking in China. This figure plots the size of the components of shadow 
banking in China from 2010 to 2019. The data come from the Quarterly China Shadow Banking Monitor by 
Moody's (March 2020): https://www.moodys.com/resea rchdo cumen tcont entpa ge.aspx?docid =PBC_1220469. The 
original sources include People Bank of China (PBoC); China Banking Wealth Management Product Registration & 
Depository Center; Asset Management Association of China; WIND; Ministry of Commerce; China Leasing Alliance; 
China Financing Guarantee Association. Note that for ‘informal lending’, it is assumed there is no change from 
the end of 2011, sourced from a survey by the PBoC in May 2011 of 6,615 corporate borrowers. ‘Others’ includes 
financial leasing, microcredit, pawn shop loans, online peer-to-peer lending, asset-based securities and consumer 
credit companies. Source: Moody's
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by listed firms, affiliated loans and non-affiliated loans. In China, listed firms are required by the stock 
exchanges to disclose the details of the entrusted loans that they make. Affiliated loans are the loans 
made by a parent firm to a subsidiary or between a customer and a supplier or between business part-
ners in a joint venture and non-affiliated loans are between two parties without such prior relationship. 
They find that both types of entrusted loans are the market reaction to credit shortage, allowing large 
listed or state-owned firms with cheap access to capital to channel funds to small-and-medium-sized 
enterprises. Chen, Ren, and Zha (2018) document the consistent conclusion that entrusted lending 
tends to be more prevalent when monetary policy is tighter.
Trust financing, intermediated by a trust company, provides funding to a project company at a 
market interest rate through the issuance of trust WMPs to investors. It is not entirely a new phenom-
enon in China's financial industry. First introduced in China in 1979 with the establishment of the first 
trust firm (China International Trust and Investment Corporation, CITIC), the trust industry experi-
enced a period of chaotic development until the enactment of the ‘Trust Law’ in 2001 as well as the 
restructuring of the whole industry afterward. The issuance of trust products and other core compo-
nents of shadow banking such as entrusted loans and bank WMPs rose significantly after the imple-
mentation of the Fiscal Stimulus Plan of 2008. Allen et al. (2020) show that the trust industry overtook 
the insurance industry to become the largest non-banking financial sector in 2012, with total assets 
amounting to 16.7 trillion RMB by 2015 (23.7% of the total GDP in 2015). The involvement of banks 
in the issuance of trust products includes sometimes being the channel for distributing these products 
as well as introducing their clients to the trust companies.5 On some occasions, banks will invest the 
money they raise through their own WMPs into the trust products of the companies they are introduc-
ing. These are referred to as Single Capital Trusts. Other forms of trust products include Collective 
Investment Trusts, which are standardized products sold to multiple investors and Property Management 
Trusts, involving the management of non-monetary assets.
Compared to commercial banks, trust companies are lightly regulated. First, in terms of liquidity, 
banks are subject to the LDR requirement, which was set up to be 75% and later lifted by the CBRC 
in late 2015. The lending flow by banks was also closely monitored by the PBoC. Another unconven-
tional policy tool utilized by the PBoC is ‘window guidance’. This type of guidance is in effect a 
system of informal credit quotas: prescribing both the desired level of credit growth and the sectors the 
real economy to which this credit should (and should not) be channeled (Allen et al., 2019). At the 
beginning of 2010, the PBoC started to restrict bank lending to certain areas, especially the real estate 
industry, in order to curb soaring housing prices.6 Second, capital regulation is also different for banks 
and trust companies. Banks are also subject to capital ratio requirement, with Tier 1 core capital ratio 
no less than 5%, Tier 1 capital ratio no less than 6% and capital ratio no less than 8%;7 while trust 
companies were not subject to any capital regulation until 2010, when the CBRC imposed the require-
ments on net capital.8 However, it is difficult to compare the capital regulations for banks and trust 
 5In 2008, the CBRC issued guidance (Order 83) to support and set regulatory rules for the cooperation between banks and 
trust companies, allowing banks to issue loans through off-balance channels such as trust companies. For more details, please 
see: http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2008-12/22/conte nt_11849 34.htm.
 6The window guidance is usually reported as part of the PBoC Quarterly Monetary Policy Reports.
 7In 2008, the CBRC issued Order 1, specifying the capital ratio requirements as well as its calculation. For more details: 
http://www.gov.cn/gongb ao/conte nt/2012/conte nt_22455 22.htm.
 8The CBRC issued Order 5 in 2010, specifying that trust companies should have net capital no less than 200 million RMB, 
no less than 100% of the total risk capital, and no less than 40% of their net assets. Net capital is defined as the net assets 
minus the deductions of risk assets, minus the risk deductions of contingent liabilities, minus other deductions defined by the 
CBRC. For more details, please see: http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2010-09/10/conte nt_16997 64.htm.
   | 7ALLEN ANd GU
companies, given the definition of net capital of trust companies by the CBRC. Some anecdotal evi-
dence shows that since then, trust companies have largely increased their capital.9 The annual finan-
cial reports show that during 2011–2015, the average equity ratio for the whole trust industry (68 trust 
companies in total) is 3.9%, while during the same period, the average equity ratio for listed banks is 
6.9%. Third, in terms of reserves, banks are subject to regulations on required reserve ratio, while trust 
companies are required to draw 5% of their after-tax profits every year as loss reserve, to a maximum 
equal to 20% of the registered capital.
Being lightly regulated, trust companies are the only type of financial institutions that can invest 
in all the sub-sectors of the capital markets, including the money market, bond market, stock market, 
credit bank, as well as the real economy in China. In contrast, commercial banks cannot invest directly 
in the stock market according to the regulation.
2.3 | Pricing of shadow banking products and related risks
Based on the intricate connection among the banks, nonbanks and capital markets, as well as the 
relatively light regulation in the shadow banking sector compared to traditional banks, an important 
question is whether the potential risks have been priced or whether there are neglected risks that 
might trigger contagion. Recent studies show that the initial pricing of shadow banking products has 
reflected the underlying risks. Allen et al. (2019) divide entrusted loans into affiliated loans to compa-
nies that they are connected to in terms of ownership and non-affiliated loans to companies that they 
have no ownership connections to. They find that affiliated loans are essentially pass-through loans 
and the borrowing firms borrow at the same rate as the lending firms, which is roughly the same as the 
loan rates from the traditional banking system; lenders of nonaffiliated loans use entrusted loans as an 
alternative investment channel because the growth rate of their main businesses is relatively low. The 
interest rates for nonaffiliated loans are on average twice as high as official bank loan rates, therefore, 
lenders of nonaffiliated loans can usually earn immediate profits by acting as credit intermediaries. 
Further, the authors find that the pricing of nonaffiliated loans reflected the fundamental risks as well 
as the informational risks of the borrowers. The lending rates increase if the borrower is in a high-risk 
industry and decrease if it is a state-owned enterprise or if the borrower and lender are in the same 
industry or located in the same city. The ex-post probability of default also increases with the lending 
rates. Overall, the evidence suggests that nonaffiliated loans tend to be more market-based transac-
tions and the pricing of these loans is risk-based.
Consistently, the pricing of trust products also relies on the underlying borrowers’ risks, the issuing 
trust companies’ risks, as well as the market risk, as shown by Allen et al. (2020). Using product-level 
data, they find that the initial yield spread is higher if the borrower is from the riskier real estate indus-
try, or located in a province with lower GDP, or if the borrower or issuing trust company is smaller. 
The product pricing also reflects the market risk that the issuing trust company is exposed to. Using 
the stock market crash in the summer of 2015 as a negative shock, the authors find that if the trust 
company has more exposure to the securities markets through issuing more products invested in those 
areas before the market crash, then the yield spreads of the issued products are significantly higher 
after the crash.
Shadow banking helps banks circumvent regulations; therefore, a further question is whether the 
growth of this sector is a source of financial instability. The evidence has been open to debate on this. 
 9As an example of a piece of anecdotal evidence: http://finan ce.people.com.cn/money /n/2013/1022/c2189 00-23283 695.html.
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In Acharya et al. (2019), the issuing banks of the WMPs take on substantial rollover risks when a 
large amount of WMPs mature. As the total amount of WMPs rises sharply, the aggregate risk also 
increases as banks need to roll over greater amounts. During the liquidity crunch in the summer of 
2013, when the cost of interbank funds rose unexpectedly, the stock price dropped more for banks 
with more WMPs maturing in the short run. This indicates that the swift rise of shadow banking has 
contributed to greater fragility of the financial system. However, from another perspective, given that 
a large number of borrowers from the shadow banking sector are riskier, if the alternative lenders are 
better capitalized than banks, the aggregate risk would be mitigated. Allen et al. (2019) provide such 
evidence. They argue that entrusted loans have the advantage that they are the assets of the lending 
firms, which have higher equity ratios than banks. The granting of entrusted loans by these firms to 
risky industries can reduce the likelihood of risk transmission from the riskier real estate sector to the 
banking system and reduce systemic risks.
2.4 | Implicit guarantees and the role of government
The possibility of borrowers failing to make loan payments can make implicit and explicit guarantees 
from either banks or nonbanks, or government attractive to investors. When failures are infrequent 
and the vast majority of investment products (including bank WMPs and trust products) pay out as ex-
pected, any implicit backstop would be highly credible. Allen et al. (2020) argue that a central feature 
of China's shadow banking sector is the prevalence of such implicit guarantees that investors come to 
expect on risky investments. They show that implicit guarantees by nonbank financial institutions in 
an environment with systemic and idiosyncratic risks can be the ‘second-best’ arrangement in funding 
risky projects. A key assumption here is that a nonbank financial intermediary has the ability to iden-
tify idiosyncratic risks associated with the project and screen out bad projects, while the investors who 
have capital, do not possess the screening technology. Implicit guarantees also allow the intermediary 
to retain the flexibility of not paying back in bad economic states. When the future of the nonbank 
intermediary is uncertain in bad economic states, such flexibility is extremely valuable, compared to 
explicit guarantees. The latter can lead to the failure of the entity providing the guarantee. Having the 
intermediary bearing the loss in those extreme bad times can also add stress to the financial system, 
further creating systemic risks. Empirically, through investigating the investment products issued by 
trust companies, Allen et al. (2020) also find consistent evidence that the credibility of the implicit 
guarantees, has been reflected in the ex-ante issuing yield spreads of the trust products. Such implicit 
guarantees come from either the issuing trust company, or the shareholder of the trust company (cen-
tral or local government), or the distributing bank. More importantly, strong implicit guarantees flat-
ten the sensitivity of yield spreads to the risks of underlying borrowers.
Huang, Huang, and Shao (2020) focus on the implicit guarantees provided by banks to WMPs that they 
have issued. They find when the risk perception of a bank increases, the bank extends stronger implicit 
guarantees to the investors to safeguard its own reputation. When banks face negative shocks, the expense 
of providing guarantees might erode bank equity and further amply the shocks and increase bank risks.
If there is failure that could trigger market disruption or further systemic risks, the government may 
intervene. One recent example in China is the crisis of Baoshang bank, a small city commercial bank 
in Inner Mongolia Province, in May 2019. The crisis originated in the interbank Negotiable Certificate 
of Deposits wholesale funding market, that Baoshang has been largely exposed to and then spilled 
over to the WMPs that Baoshang has issued as well as the deposits. Upon the outbreak of the crisis, the 
PBoC and CBRC took over the operations of Baoshang bank. This event illustrates how the Chinese 
government plays an important, if often implicit, role in backstopping the fragility of the financial 
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system. It is also natural to expect that during market turmoil, market participants closer to the center 
of the government are more likely to obtain support through government intervention. The expectation 
of government intervention can also lead to risk-seeking activities by creditors, to continue to provide 
credit at lower costs to entities closer to the government. This can further amply risk in the financial 
system (Song & Xiong, 2018). Zhu (2016) provides an extensive description of how government 
guarantees might have contributed to asset bubbles and speculation in China.
3 |  COMPARING TO OTHER COUNTRIES: SHADOW 
BANKING IN THE EURO AREA, THE United Kingdom AND 
United States
As mentioned above, shadow banking is broadly defined as credit intermediation that occurs through 
activities and entities outside the regulated financial system (Adrian & Ashcraft, 2012). In the United 
States, shadow banks intermediate credit through a wide range of securitization and secured fund-
ing techniques such as asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), asset-backed securities (ABS), col-
lateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and repurchase agreements (repos) (Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, 
& Boesky, 2012). Before the outbreak of the Subprime Crisis in the United States in 2007, shadow 
banking provided sources of funding by converting opaque, risky, long-term assets into short-term 
liabilities with less risk. Such credit creation through credit, maturity and liquidity transformation, 
significantly reduced the cost of credit relative to direct lending, which further contributed to the asset 
price appreciation in the real estate market. However, heavy reliance on short-term liabilities to fund 
illiquid long-term assets made the system more fragile and prone to runs.
Similarly, in the Euro Area, the main components of the shadow banking system include securiti-
zation activities, money market funds, repo markets as well as hedge funds. ABCP and ABSs are the 
most important forms of securitization in Europe. ABSs also account for a large share of the assets 
held in the Euro Area as collateral for the repo operations of liquidity provision; and the large majority 
(65%) of the assets underlying ABSs are loans (Bakk-Simon et al., 2012).
Panel A of Figure 4 plots the change in total assets of shadow banking in China, the Euro Area (8 
countries), the United Kingdom and United States over 2006–2018,10 using the narrow measure of 
shadow banking by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), referred to as financial entities that engage in 
credit intermediation involving liquidity/maturity transformation or leverage.11 Although the aggre-
gate growth rate has been slowing around the world, in 2018, the United States still has the largest 
shadow banking sector, compared to other countries, amounting to 15.2 trillion USD and representing 
74.2% of its GDP and 29.9% of the total shadow banking assets of the 29 jurisdictions covered by the 
FSB. The eight participating Euro Area countries comprise the next largest share, with a combined 
 10In FSB’s monitoring on global shadow banking and nonbank financial intermediation, among the 29 jurisdictions that FSB 
reports, the eight countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain) in the Euro Area are 
covered.
 11Based on the FSB policy framework, the narrow measure of shadow banking includes five types of activities of credit 
intermediation: management of collective investment vehicles features that make them susceptible to runs (money market 
funds, fixed-income funds, credit hedge funds, etc.); loan provision dependent on short-term funding (finance companies; 
leasing/factoring companies, etc.); intermediation of market activities dependent on short-term funding or on secured funding 
of client assets (broker-dealers, securities finance companies); facilitation of credit creation (credit insurance companies. 
financial guarantors, etc.); or securitization-based credit intermediation and funding of financial entities (securitization 
vehicles, structured finance vehicles, etc.). Since the 2018 report, the FSB replaced the term “shadow banking” with 
“nonbank financial intermediation” (NBFI), to emphasize the forward-looking aspect of the FSB’s work.
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FIGURE 4 Comparing the size of shadow banking: the Euro Area, China, the United Kingdom and United States. 
Panel A: Size of shadow banking: 2006–2018. This figure plots the total assets of nonbank financial intermediation 
(narrow measure) over GDP, for the Euro Area (8 countries), China, the United Kingdom and United States, from 
2006 to 2018. Among the 29 jurisdictions that the Financial Stability Board (FSB) reports, eight countries (Belgium, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain) in the Euro Area are covered. The narrow measure, 
defined by the FSB Policy Framework, is comprised of nonbank financial institutions that authorities have assessed 
as being involved in credit intermediation activities that may pose bank-like financial stability risks (i.e., involving 
maturity/liquidity transformation, leverage or imperfect credit risk transfer) and/or regulatory arbitrage. The narrow 
measure of NBFIs captures the shadow banking through the exclusion of entities that are not typically part of a credit 
intermediation chain, or if they are not involved in significant maturity/liquidity transformation and/or leverage. Since 
the 2018 report, the FSB replaced the term ‘shadow banking’ with ‘nonbank financial intermediation’ (NBFI), to 
emphasize the forward-looking aspect of the FSB’s work. Source: FSB, Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report: 
2012–2017; Global Monitoring Report on Non-bank Financial Intermediation: 2018–2019. Panel B: Components of 
shadow banking: 2010 versus 2018. This figure plots the components of the narrow measure of nonbank financial 
intermediation (over GDP) for the Euro Area (8 countries), China, the United Kingdom and United States, in 2010 
versus 2018. Among the 29 jurisdictions that FSB reports, eight countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain) in the Euro Area are covered. The classification of the components is defined by 
FSB, using economic functions (EFs): EF1 refers to the management of collective investment vehicles features that 
make them susceptible to runs (money market funds, fixed-income funds, credit hedge funds, mixed funds, real estate 
funds); EF2 refers to loan provision dependent on short-term funding (finance companies; leasing/factoring companies, 
consumer credit companies); EF3 refers to the intermediation of market activities dependent on short-term funding 
or on secured funding of client assets (broker-dealers, securities finance companies); EF4 refers to the facilitation of 
credit creation (credit insurance companies, financial guarantors, monolines); EF5 refers to securitization based credit 
intermediation and funding of financial entities (securitization vehicles, structured finance vehicles, asset-backed 
securities). Source: FSB, Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report: 2012–2017; Global Monitoring Report on Non-
bank Financial Intermediation: 2018–2019
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12.2 trillion USD, 102% of its GDP and 23.6% of the total shadow banking assets of the 29 jurisdic-
tions, followed by China, totaling 7.8 trillion USD, 61% of its GDP and 15.4% of the total shadow 
banking assets of the 29 jurisdictions. The shadow banking assets of the United Kingdom amount to 
1.4 trillion USD in 2018 and account for 52% of its GDP. According to FSB statistics, from 2009 to 
2018, the narrow measure of shadow banking assets (over GDP) has been growing from 4.% to 61% 
for China, from 35% to 52% for the United Kingdom, from 77% to 102% for Euro Area (8 countries), 
while decreasing from 112% to 74% for the United States.
Panel B of Figure 4 shows the breakdown of shadow banking in 2010 versus 2018, for the Euro 
Area, China, the United Kingdom and United States. In 2018, across different countries (regions), the 
largest component is collective investment vehicles (money market funds, fixed-income funds, credit 
hedge funds and all types of mixed funds). In the United States, both the intermediation of market 
activities based on short-term funding or on secured funding and the securitization-based credit inter-
mediation have shrunk significantly in 2018, compared with 2010. In both the United Kingdom and 
Euro Area, the collective investment vehicles and intermediation on short-term funding and securities 
funding have increased in 2018, compared to 2010.
A number of recent studies examine shadow banking in the United States (e.g., Acharya, Schnabl, & 
Suarez, 2013; Buchak, Matvox, & Seru, 2018; Gorton & Metrick, 2010; Irani, Iyer, Meisenzahl, & 
Peydro, 2020). Adrian and Ashcraft (2012) provide a review of the evolving literature on this. Although 
regulatory burden and arbitrage is a common reason behind the rise in shadow banking in the last decade 
(e.g., Kashyap, Stein, & Hanson, 2010; Ordonez, 2018; Plantin, 2015), one main difference between 
China and United States shadow banking is the size of the involving banks (Hachem, 2018). In China, 
smaller banks engage more in issuing off-balance-sheet WMPs as they are more constrained by liquidity 
requirements such as LDRs; while in the United States, larger banks went off-balance-sheet, as they are 
more constrained by capital requirements. For example, Irani et al. (2020) investigate the connection 
between bank capital regulation and the prevalence of nonbanks in the United States. They find that 
less-capitalized banks reduce loan intention, particularly loans with higher capital requirements and at 
times when capital is scarce, with a significant proportion of credit reallocated to nonbanks.12
Another difference that the literature has discussed is the role of banks in the growth of shadow 
banking. The United States shadow banking system is a market-based one and relies on financial 
engineering to reduce funding costs for firms and create safe assets for investors, while in China, 
market-based financial instruments or securitization have not been as relevant a factor as in the United 
States. So far, China's shadow banking is more bank-centric and operates on implicit guarantees by 
banks as well as government (Dang et al., 2019; Ehlers, Kong, & Zhu, 2018).
Though the structure of shadow banking and the involvement of financial institutions are unique in 
China, the challenges this sector brings to the financial system as well as to policy making are similar. 
For example, Gennaioli, Vishny, and Shleifer (2013) argue that when investors and intermediaries 
neglect extreme risks, the growth of risky lending by shadow banks might create fragility in liquidity 
over time. Xiao (2020) finds that monetary tightening could unintentionally increase financial fragil-
ity by driving deposits into the uninsured shadow banking sector. D’Avernas, Vandeweyer, and Paries 
(2020) document that the presence of a sizable shadow banking sector, without access to central bank 
operations, limits the transmission of monetary policy to asset prices. Consistently, Chen et al. (2018) 
find the rapid expansion of China's shadow banking dampens the effectiveness of monetary policy 
in controlling bank credit. Brunnermeier, Sockin, and Xiong (2017) argue that China's liberalized 
financial system, by loosening regulations on the shadow banking system, prevents the government 
from experimenting with an easily reversible temporary economic stimulus plan. However, as Allen 
 12But such evidence is only found for larger banks, not for smaller banks with assets fewer than 1 billion USD.
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et al. (2019) argue shadow banking in China can also be beneficial to financial stability as the example 
of entrusted loans illustrate. By placing the stronger balance sheet of the lending non-financial com-
pany in between banks and risky industries such as real estate, financial stability is improved.
4 |  CONCLUDING REMARKS
Driven by the regulatory burden in the traditional banks as well as the credit constraints in certain re-
strictive areas, China's shadow banking has grown rapidly in the last decade. Although the regulators 
have repeatedly attempted to curb the off-balance-sheet activities of banks and impose new regula-
tions on banks and nonbanks, the shadow banking sector has been able to avoid the newly introduced 
rules and continue growing. The existence of this sector fulfills the high demand for funding, while it 
may also pose risks to financial stability. It may be neither feasible nor desirable for formal regulatory 
regimes to eliminate all the risks in the financial system. Implicit guarantees from banks, nonbanks or 
government might provide a second-best arrangement in funding risky projects and improving wel-
fare where idiosyncratic and systemic risks are possible. Going forward, more research is needed in 
understanding the balance of market force and government intervention in maintaining the stability of 
the shadow banking sector, while serving the goal of improving access to finance.
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